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CASE COMMENT
Attorney and Client: Conflict of Interest-Professional Ethics-
Government Attorneys
By WALTER I. AURAN
Graduated from the University of North Dakota in 1955 with a B.S. de-
gree, the author is presently a senior at the Universiy of Denver College
of Law.
The United States brought a civil suit to recover funds from
an oil company for alleged overcharges in sales financed under the
Economic Co-operation Act. The Government moved to disqualify
the law firm representing the defendant on the ground that one of
its partners, who was actively working on the case, had been em-
ployed by the Economic Co-operation A'dministration for more than
two of the years during which the alleged overcharges were made.
The attorney had worked in the Paris Office of the ECA but had
not been connected with the particular activities giving rise to the
suit. The court held that the canons of professional ethics of the
American Bar Association did not prohibit the firm from represent-
ing the oil company. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp.
345 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
Plaintiff brought a civil suit against the United States to re-
cover a sum allegedly due pursuant to contracts between the plain-
tiff and the Veterans Administration. The Government moved to
disqualify the attorney representing the plaintiff on the ground
that he had been formerly employed as a government attorney by
the V. A. and had actually passed upon a number of matters in-
volved in the present suit. The court held that the canons of pro-
fessional ethics of the American Bar Association prohibited the
attorney from representing the plaintiff. Empire Linotype School,
Inc. v. United States, 143 F. Supp. 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
The instant cases involve the principles laid down by Canons
6,1 362 and 37,3 of the American Bar Association's canons of pro-
fessional ethics. These canons are based on the theory that when a
client entrusts an attorney with the handling of a particular mat-
ter, he should be encouraged to reveal to that counsel all the infor-
mation at his disposal, including confidential matter. Once confi-
dence has been reposed, the client must be secure in his belief that
the lawyer, without the client's consent, will be forever barred
from disclosing such confidences, even after termination of the
' Canon 6 provides, in part: "The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and
not to divulge his secrets or confidences forbids also the subsequent acceptance of retainers or em-
ployment from others in matters adversely affecting any interest of the client with respect to which
confidence has been reposed." Cf. I Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. 141 (1953).
!Canon 36 provides, in part: "A lawyer, having once held pulic office or having been in the
public employ, should not after his retirement accept employment in connection with any matter
which he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ." Id. at 148.
e Canon 37 provides, in part: "it is the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's confidences.
This duty outlasts the lawyer's employment . . ." Ibid.
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attorney's employment. 4 In addition, courts have interpreted the
canons as imposing a duty upon attorneys to avoid not only the
actuality but the appearance of evil. 5
When disqualification of any attorney has been sought on the
ground that his continued representation of a present client will
violate the confidence of a former client, the complainant normally
is required to prove only a "substantial relationship," not identity,
between the subject matter of the present employment and matters
in which the attorney acted for the former client.6 The complain-
ant need not show that the attorney had actual knowledge of such
substantially related material, but a showing of access to it is suf-
ficient. 7 Such a showing gives rise to an inference that confidential
information was reposed by the former client and the attorney
can thereby be disqualified.8 Thus, it has been held repeatedly that
the knowledge of one member of a law firm will be imputed to all
members and associates of that firm. In the majority of cases in-
volving this question, the offending attorney has either accepted
a retainer from the other side in a retrial of the same case in which
he had formerly represented the complainant,0 or he has taken a
position adverse to a former client in a specific matter in which
he had previously represented that client."
In the Standard Oil case the court had to determine whether
the government attorney employed by the Paris office of the ECA
could be said to have access to substantially related confidential
information in the files of the Washington office. Further, the judge
was required to determine whether the "imputed knowledge" rule
'Stockton Theatres, Inc. v. Palerma, 121 Cal. App. 2d 616, 264 P. 2d 74, 80 (D. C. A. 3d D.
1953); Note, 64 Yale L. J. 917, 927 (1955).
4See Drinker, Legal Ethics 130-1 (1954).
6T. C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
' Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Warner Bros Circuit Management Corp., 216 F. 2d 920, 927 (2d
Cir. 1954).
s Ibid.
0 E. g., Laskey Bros. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 224 F. 2d 824, 826-7 (2d Cir. 1955); see
note 7 supra.
10. g., United States v. Bishop, 90 F. 2d 65 (6th Cir. 1937); Porter v. Huber, 68 F. Supp. 132
(W.D. Wash. 1946); In re Maltby, 68 Ariz. 153, 202 P. 2d 902, 903 (1949); In re Thenelis, 117 Vt.
19, 83 A. 2d 507 (1951).
u E. g., General Contract Purchase Corp. v. Armour, 125 F. 2d 147 (5th Cir. 1942); Thatcher v.
United States, 212 Fed. 801 (6th Cir. 1914); Sheffield v. State Bar, 22 Cal. 2d 627, 140 P. 2d 376
(1943); Federal Trust Co. v. Damron, 124 Neb. 655, 247 N. W. 589 (1933); Watson v. Watson, 171
Misc. 175, 11 N.Y.S. 2d 537 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
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applying to ordinary law partnerships should be as strictly applied
when the partnership is in fact the government. However in the
Empire Linotype case the court had to decide only whether the
former government attorney actually had passed on some of the
matters involved in the action. It is significant to note that when
an attorney is employed by the government, the latter is in the
dual position of being the partnership and also the client. There-
fore, even though the "conflicting interests" and "confidential com-
munications" rules of Canons 6 and 37, respectively, still bind the
former government attorney with a duty of fidelity to his client,
that duty should not be applied without reference to the practical
problems encountered when government employed attorneys are
involved. In the Standard Oil case the court recognized these prac-
tical problems by holding that the "access to substantially related
information" rule should not be applied to a government attorney
working for a vast agency where it is shown that he actually did
not receive, investigate or pass upon such confidential infor-
mation.12
As to the imputed knowledge rule, the court in Standard Oil
held that the rule could not be applied to the entire agency in
which the former government attorney had been employed. Rather
its application should be restricted to the particular office of em-
ployment and the specific matters investigated and passed upon by
that office. This rationale was applied in the Empire Linotype case.
As the instant cases point out, ethical problems cannot be
viewed in a vacuum, but must be given a practical approach. This
is important for the benefit of the government which must con-
stantly recruit attorneys from private practice. If service with the
government would tend to disqualify an attorney in too large an
area of law for too long a time, or would prevent his engaging in the
practice of the very specialty for which the government sought his
service, and if that disqualification would infect the firm with
which he becomes associated, the sacrifices of entering government
service would be too great for most men to make. As for men will-
ing to make these sacrifices, not only would they and their firms
suffer restricted practice thereafter, but clients would find it diffi-
cult to obtain specialized counsel.
136 F. Supp. at 363.
Best Wishes to the Bar Association
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Criminal Law-Habitual Criminal Act-Offense Punishable by
Reformatory Sentence Not Felony
By RICHARD A. ZARLENGO
Richard A. Zarlengo is a student at the University of Denver College of
Law. He was graduated from the University of Colorado in 1953 with a
B. S. in Business degree. He is a member of the Dicta Board of Editors
and has served on the law school Board of Governors.
Theodore William Smalley was convicted in 1932 of burglary
and larceny. At the time of this conviction he was nineteen years of
age and was sentenced in accordance with a state statute requiring,
with certain exceptions, that all male persons over sixteen and un-
der twenty-one years of age who are for the first time convicted of a
felony be sentenced to the state reformatory.' Smalley was later
convicted of grand larceny in 1933, of burglary and grand larceny
in 1936, and of burglary in 1946. He was sentenced to the state
penitentiary for each of the latter convictions. As a result of these
four convictions, Smalley was sentenced to life imprisonment un-
der the Colorado habitual criminal act.2 The latter statute provides
life imprisonment for one convicted of four felonies. Smalley filed
a motion to set aside his life sentence on the grounds that it was
void and erroneous. The Colorado Constitution defines a felony as
"any criminal offense punishable by death or imprisonment in the
penitentiary and no other."' It was Smalley's contention that since
a reformatory sentence was mandatory by statute he could not
have been sentenced to the state penitentiary and, therefore, his
first conviction was not a felony conviction as defined by the Colo-
rado Constitution. The district court overruled the motion, but was
reversed by the Supreme Court on the grounds that under the
Colorado Constitution the test of a felony is the possible form of
punishment and place of confinement in case of conviction. Since
the place of confinement prescribed by statute in this case was the
reformatory, the offense could not have been a felony. Smalley v.
People,.304 P.2d 902 (Colo. 1957).
It is well established in Colorado that the test of whether or
not an offense is a felony as defined in the constitution depends on
the punishment prescribed by the legislature and not on the sen-
tence actually imposed on the defendant in a given case.4 If an
offense is punishable by death or imprisonment in the penitentiary,
it is a felony even though the legislature allows the court to pre-
scribe a lesser punishment at its discretion and the court does, in
fact, impose such lesser punishment on the defendant. 5 In its posi-
tion on this point, the Colorado Supreme Court seems to be in
accord with the majority of other jurisdictions having similar defi-
nitions of felony.6
An analysis of the briefs in the Smalley case indicates that
what was in effect presented was the question whether an objective
,Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 39-10-1 (1953).
Id. § 39-13-1.
3Cala. Canst. Art. XVIII, § 4 (1876)
. People Y. Gadding, 55 Colo. 579, 136 Pac. 1011 (1913) (cited with approval in Smalley).
5 Ibid.
a See, e.g., Bards v. United States, 224 F.2d 959 (6th Cir. 1956); Jackson v. State, 37 Ala. App.




or a subjective test should be applied to each case in determining
if the individual involved has committed a felony. If an objective
test were to be applied, the individual involved would be ignored
and only the offense committed would be considered. If the statute
making the act a crime provides for punishment by death or im-
prisonment in the state penitentiary, the offense would be classified
as a felony and the fact that a certain defendant could not be sent
to the penitentiary because of age would be immaterial. If a sub-
jective test be applied, each individual defendant would be con-
sidered and whether a felony has been committed would not de-
pend on the offense committed but would depend on the maximum
sentence which could be imposed on that individual taking into
consideration all of the statutes governing the sentencing of that
individual.
In the Smalley case the majority of the court chose to follow
the latter of these alternatives thus establishing that a person can
commit a felony only if the maximum sentence which may be im-
posed upon him is death or imprisonment in the state penitentiary.
It should be stressed that the decision in this case does not make
the sentence actually imposed on an individual the test of a felony.
The test is what sentence could have been imposed on that in-
dividual.
As a result of the Smalley case, the statute dealing with re-
formatory sentencing7 was amended by the 1957 session of the
legislature.8 As amended, it leaves to the trial court's discretion
whether a person between the ages of sixteen and twenty-five
years of age who has been convicted of a felony should be sen-
tenced to the reformatory or to the penitentiary. Since the test is
the sentence which can be imposed and not the sentence actually
imposed, the result of this amendment is to make future offenders
sixteen years of age and older guilty of felonies if the crimes for
which they are convicted carry possible penitentiary sentences
even if the judge, in his discretion, actually imposes reformatory
sentences. As to anyone presently serving a sentence as a habitual
criminal because of any "felony" conviction before he reached the
age of twenty-one, the amendment does not affect his right to be
released because he could not have been sentenced to the peniten-
tiary at the time of his conviction under the statute then in effect
and, therefore, his offense was not a felony.
See note 1 supra.
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